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TRUST, RECIPROCITY, AND SOCIAL HISTORY 
New Pathways of Learning When Max U (own reward) Fails Decisively 
Vernon L. Smith1 
Chapman University    
 
In 1995, Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe (hereafter BDM) 
inaugurated entirely new directions of experimental investigation, business 
research, and human sociability in their study of trust and trustworthiness (BDM 
called it trust and reciprocity). Building on research results from the study of 
ultimatum and dictator games, BDM ignited widespread research interest—Google 
Scholar indicates 5242 citations through September, 2019. Johnson and Mislin 
(2011) offer a meta-analysis of BDM using data from 162 replications across 35 
countries, and 23,000 subjects, but replications and extensions have continued 
unabated since these data were assembled. Few experiments have approached that 
of BDM in launching such extensive further investigation.   
What accounts for the incredible scholarly popularity of the BDM protocol and its 
many derivative studies?  
Subjects in the BDM protocol chose unexpectedly high levels of cooperative other-
regarding action, under conditions of strict privacy and anonymity that invited self-
interested action under a heavy cloak of secrecy.  Their findings seemed at odds 
with dictator games in which similar conditions of anonymity and secrecy had 
greatly reduced dictator game “generosity.” After all, BDM was “merely” a two 
stage dictator game. The observations also appeared to be at complete odds with 
the own-regarding actions that had dominated in market experiments beginning a 
half century earlier. (Chamberlin, 1948; Smith, 1962; see Holt, 2019, pp 1-35 for a 
historical summary)2 The BDM investment game challenged the beliefs underlying 
economic modelling, altered research directions, and ignited a search for 
understanding—for reconciling disparate bodies of data, each highly replicable and 
coming from people in the same sampling populations.  Can these distinct and 
contradictory patterns be reconciled in one underlying theory, or are we stuck with 
a two-regime theoretical justification?  
 
1 I am grateful to Andreas Ortmann for his careful reading of two earlier drafts of this paper and providing 
extensive comment, while not absolving myself from responsibility for and errors that remain.    
2 As we shall see below these appearances were not correct; both own-regarding and other-regarding human 
action are consistent with strictly self-interested preferences in Smith (1759; 1853). The path-breaking work of 
BDM has helped immeasurably in enabling Smith’s classical work to be rehabilitated.  
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This evaluation begins with the BDM protocol—itself a methodological 
contribution—and the experimental findings. The question of the replicability and 
robustness of these unexpected results is addressed next in a summary of two 
subsequent experimental papers. We follow with a discussion of two attempts to 
explain qua understand the BDM findings; both, however, have methological 
deficiencies—Reciprocity and Social Preference explanations. Finally, we offer a 
brief on Adam Smith’s (1759; 1853; hereafter in the text, Sentiments) model of 
human sociability, based on strictly self-interested actors, that culminates in 
propositions that (1) account for trust game choices, and (2) predict action in new 
variations on trust game designs that, in the absence of Adam Smith’s model, 
would be neither natural or well-motivated.   
THE BDM PROTOCOL: FIRST RESULTS AND “SOCIAL HISTORY” 
REPLICATION 
Introduction 
Across three sessions BDM recruited 32 pairs of subjects. In each session half the 
individuals were recruited for room A, and half for room B.3 Each received ten $1 
bills as an upfront payment for showing up on time—an intentional form of earned 
compensation that belongs to the individual. Each person in room A is free to 
select from their money payment any number, from 0 to 10 one-dollar bills to be 
sent to their anonymous and randomly paired counterpart in room B. In route, the 
sum is tripled before delivery to the person’s counterpart in room B. BDM 
implemented a double-anonymity protocol wherein each pair is anonymous with 
respect to each other and to any and all third parties including the experimenters. 
No one can know who sent whom how much money.  
This procedure was a departure from commonly practiced protocols and generated 
some entirely appropriate controversy that we will discuss as part of our 
reexamination and review.4 Methodological challenges—what does it mean to test 
a theory? —are part of daily life in any and all experimental sciences. That 
meaning emerges out of the personal experiences and conversation of 
experimentalists whose “knowledge in science is not made but discovered, and as 
such it claims to establish contact with reality beyond the clues on which it 
relies….For we live in it as in the garment of our own skin.” (Polanyi, 1964, p 64; 
 
3 When the subjects were recruited, they were told to come to either room A or B, making it credible that there 
really were two rooms (no deception); a monitor was chosen in each room to carry envelops to the other room, 
further making it evident that real people were paired with real people and no deception was possible. Also, by not 
first meeting in one room, there was additional social control in support of the concept of paired “strangers.”  
4 Every experimental science depends on an immense body of “experimental knowledge,” a specialized form of 
human capital based on practice and the ongoing evaluation, and re-evaluation, of the state of that knowledge; 
this is the life blood of any experimental science. (Mayo, 1996; Smith, 2008, chapter 13)  
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also see Mayo, 1996 on the role of experimental methodology in reducing belief 
error.)  
The Dictator Game as a Precursor of the Investment Trust Game  
The dictator game (DG) evolved from the study of the ultimatum game (UG) as 
part of explorations designed to better understand the unexpected findings by Guth, 
Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982) who originated the UG.  In this game the 
Proposer offers to split M one-dollar bills with the Responder, yielding (Proposer 
payoff, Responder payoff) = (M—X, X). M is commonly $10 or $20. Play then 
passes to the Responder who either accepts the offer, in which case the imputation 
is (M—X, X), or rejects the offer, in which case the outcome is (0, 0). If the 
players are each strictly self-interested and always choosing dominant own payoff 
outcomes, the predicted equilibrium offer is (M—1, 1), since $1 clearly dominates 
0, and the Responder is predicted to accept. On average, Proposers offer about 
0.45M, and Responders accept almost all offers. Responders routinely tend to 
reject infrequent offers of $1 or $2 and even of $3. 
The predominance of offers of $4 and $5 led to the ex post hoc explanation that 
people had a strong preference for “fairness” or an equal-outcome division of M.  
This interpretation was challenged by Forsythe, et al. (1994). They argued that if 
the results were driven by a strong preference for equal split “fairness” then the 
results would not be effected by eliminating the Responder’s right to veto the 
Proposer’s offer. Hence, they compare UG treatments with and without the 
responder being allowed to veto the offer, and report mean offers of 0.47M when 
Responder can veto, and (significantly less) 0.24M when Responder cannot veto 
(See Camerer, 2003, Tables 2.2 and 2.3, pp 50-55; and 2.4, pp 57-58; he 
conveniently reports data from all the early studies). The no-veto treatment quickly 
became known as the DG and took on an experimental life of its own.  
Next—in this scenario from UG to DG to BDM—enters Hoffman et al. (1994; 
hereafter HMSS) who report many treatment variations on the UG and the DG.5 In 
particular, although DG offers are significantly less than UG offers reported in 
Forsythe et al. (1994), HMSS were intrigued and impressed by the fact that 
dictators are nevertheless giving away twenty-four percent of their endowments. 
To stress the boundary of these unexpected, but persistent DG results, they 
 
5 The reader should note that the four papers in this scenario were all published in 1994-1995 as the various 
authors were all in contact with each other and working from pre-publication drafts of their respective papers.    
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introduce a “double-blind” procedure to see if DG generosity is materially reduced, 
or stubbornly resistant, to this treatment protocol.6 
Legitimacy of the Double-Blind Treatment Component 
The double-blind treatment procedures used by HMSS and by BDM, has been 
criticized as representing an illegitimate experimenter-demand effect “by too 
clearly indicating the goals of the experimenter.” (Kagel and Roth, 1995, p 303) 
This constitutes a misunderstanding of the purpose and objectives behind this 
protocol.  BDM and HMSS, in controlling for reputation and other social effects, 
intentionally sought to invite and encourage strictly self-serving action by making 
it surveillance-safe and transparent, that it is ok not to send money, and ok to keep 
any money received. (Smith, 1982, refers to such explorations as boundary 
experiments) HMSS found that the procedure substantially (as well as 
significantly) lowered dictator giving (on average from 0.24M to 0.10M, with the 
percent giving nothing rising from 20% to 60%). Similarly, in BDM, which is 
merely a two stage DG, we have a doubling of the opportunity to secretly give 
nothing. If cooperation fails, we have evidence of the power of self-interested 
motivation—Max-U(own)—to be expressed under the cloak of secrecy as a control 
for social value and influence. If cooperation persists, we meaningfully expand the 
range of conditions where the standard “strangers” model fails. In exploring the 
boundaries of that persistence, the BDM experiment either expands the range of 
self-interested action, or launches us into explorations of why robust cooperation 
trumps the temptation to serve private advantage?  
We were not to be disappointed in this polarizing stress test, for BDM find that the 
dramatic effect found by HMSS in reduced DG giving does not carry over to the 
trust game. Moreover, far from reducing cooperation it is substantially increased. 
Hence, the interpretation that people in the BDM trust game see it in a completely 
different way than they see the DG. The trust game is indeed much different than a 
sequential DG—the tripling of any amount sent implies gains from trust/trustee 
interaction, a synergy that is absent in DG, and it is this leveraging of the reward 
stakes that seems to invite a much different experiential response, such as the 
BDM emphasis on “reciprocity”.     
The important learning from these experiments is that other-regarding action 
trumps and robustly survives instructional treatments designed strongly to 
encourage self-interested action. This powerful finding demonstrates the strength 
of human sociability, and robustly falsifies the traditional economic and game-
 
6 The term “double-blind” is used here in the sense that subject identity is protected (1) between and among the 
subjects participating in a (“single-blind”) experiment, but is also protected (2) between the subject, the 
experimenter, and any other potential observer.  
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theoretic modeling based on self-interested action. Methodologies that preclude 
such boundary experiments because of unexamined hypothetical experimenter-
demand effects fail to afford opportunities for identifying the edges of validity of 
new and unexpected findings—or establish that there are no edges.  
Beyond the moral imperative that subjects be treated with respect, dignity, 
payment for their earnest service, and strict adherence to the principle that the 
experimenter shalt not bear false witness (don’t lie to the subjects or anyone else), 
experimental methods must be free and open to new means of learning.7 
For a non-cooperative equilibrium of the game, sufficient conditions are that (1) all 
are strictly self-interested, (2) this is common knowledge, and (3) each chooses to 
maximize their own utilitarian outcome. It follows that individuals in room A are 
predicted to send nothing; those in room B return nothing if any money is sent.  
This prediction does badly even under the supposed favorable condition where no 
one, not even the experimenter, can know the identity of any individual actor. The 
primary implication was that it was a good idea for researchers to seek better ways 
of thinking about two-person connectedness. Massive prediction failure ought to 
motivate re-evaluation and new learning on a similar scale. As we aim to show 
here, that failure was not newsworthy within the framework of Sentiments, 
published over two hundred fifty years before BDM. Moreover, this classical 
contribution to social psychology expands the range of new experimental designs 
and prediction. Our only excuse was that we were either ignorant of Sentiments or 
did not understand its message for embracing BDM and their aftermath. 
BDM Results  
On average, individuals in room A sent $5.16, but the average amount returned 
was $4.66; two subjects sent zero and five sent $10; twenty-eight of thirty-two 
people in room A sent more than $1. Since sending money yielded an overall loss, 
senders’ beliefs in the game appeared mistaken. Hence, BDM followed with their 
“social history” treatment in which new subjects, informed by a summary of the 
first experiment results, could adapt and correct their beliefs. The social history 
summary treatment reported the number of subjects sending each amount from 
$1.00 to $10.00, the average amount returned and average profit of the sender; the 
only net profitable amounts sent were $5 and $10.  
However, the BDM conjecture—that subjects would correct their belief error—
was not supported: Now, the average amount sent increases slightly to $5.36, but 
 
7 Psychological research traditions are not self-bound by any such moral imperative although the latter is rooted in 
the experimental research of the psychologist, Sydney Siegel, one of the early founders of experimental 
economics. (Smith, 2017)   
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the average returned increases to $6.46. The baseline norm, “be generous in 
sending” does not unravel in the social history treatment, while the trustworthy 
norm, “be generous in rewarding trust” is enhanced; 3 of 28 send nothing, half (14) 
of those in room A send $5 or $10, with only one recipient in room B keeping all 
that was sent. 
  
SKEPTICS CHALLENGE THE BDM RESULTS, FIND ONLY 
CONFIRMING EVIDENCE, AND SIGNIFICANTLY EXTEND THE 
DOMAIN OF BDM APPLICABILITY 
In the large subsequent literature, two studies, both by scholars skeptical of the 
robustness of these remarkable findings, continued to observe results inconsistent 
with Max-U (own payoff) rationality in experiments motivated by the BDM 
findings. In the first, Andreas Ortmann, John Fitzgerald, and Carl Boeing (2000; 
hereafter OFB) comprehensively replicated and reexamined the BDM experiments 
adding new treatments that they hypothesized would change the findings.  
They study five treatments:  
First, a baseline “No History” treatment which replicated the original BDM 
experiments. 
Second, a replication of the BDM “Social History” treatment by presenting 
the results from the first baseline treatment, precisely as did BDM, by 
simply presenting the values of previous investments and returns in a table.8 
Third, a “Social History” treatment framing the previous experimental 
results in terms of the portion that room B participants returned to A, clearly 
showing room A participants that the returns were not equitable.  
Fourth, a second “baseline No History treatment” characterized, however, by 
several key modifications. 
 
8 Experimental economists often encounter journal editorial resistance to publishing “mere replications,” 
especially in the leading journals that seek to pioneer new and innovative work, while personally placing high 
priority on the scientific importance of replications.  The solution to this challenge for many has taken the form of 
combining replication with new treatment variations on the original motivating study. (Smith, 1994, p 128) 
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Specifically, OFB included a questionnaire for the room A 
participants which they were to complete prior to their decision. 
Specifically, this questionnaire had two purposes. First, it was to 
ensure that room A subjects understood the design and considered 
their decisions carefully before making them. Second, it was to help 
subjects determine how much to invest by encouraging them to think 
carefully (prompt strategic reasoning)9 about the consequences of 
their decisions before they made them. The subjects were asked the 
following four questions: 
1. How much money do you think you will send? 
2. How much money will your room B counterpart receive if 
you send this much? 
3. How much money do you think will be returned to you? 
4. How much money would you return if you were in room B? 
The authors hypothesized that by changing the presentation format in 
Treatment Three, and prompting strategic reasoning as in Treatment Four it 
would cause significant drops in both the amounts sent to room B from A, 
and consequently the amounts returned to room A from B. As we shall see, 
however, these modifications had no effect. 
Fifth, Treatment Five and Five R each applied the combined modifications 
of Treatments Three and Four, with Five R a replication of Treatment Five 
designed to further test the statistical significance finding in Treatment Five. 
“When Berg et al. used their social history treatment, contributions did not 
change much. The median remained at $5 and only 3 out of 28 subjects sent 
zero…none of our treatments led to significantly different results. This 
means that neither the way information is presented (BDM presentation, 
OFB presentation) nor strategic reasoning prompts (the questionnaire) 
matter statistically to our subject pool. In fact, as the results for treatment 
Five and its replication show, nor do these two modifications to the original 
design matter jointly if we pool the data.” (Ortmann, et al., 2000, pp 85-6) In 
their abstract OFB express the unexpectedness of their findings: “To our 
 
9 Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (2000) used instructions to “prompt” subjects to think about what their paired 
counterpart would do in the UG, but it simply focused them on the prospect that Responder might veto the 
proposal (not on the strategic idea that $1 was better than nothing, which ought to be acceptable), and their offers 
became more generous.    
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surprise, none of our various treatments led to a reduction in the amount 
invested.”  
A second skeptical examination of BDM substantially alters the BDM framework, 
while polarizing the potential outcome depending upon how the subjects’ respond. 
(McCabe and Smith, 2000; hereafter MS) Senders in the BDM game can choose 
any of eleven amounts from zero to ten dollars to send to their counterpart; if X 
dollars are sent (0 ≤ X ≤ 10), receivers can return any amounts from zero up to and 
including 3X dollars.   
MS dichotomize the choices for each of the players so that each can choose only 
two starkly contrasting actions. The MS payoffs are motivated by BDM, but the 
BDM context—two people matched in a sending, tripling and returning money 
relationship—is stripped out of the MS narrative.  One of only two actions by each 
of the players provides the largest self-interested outcome, the other a “fair” equal 
split of the joint gains. Thus, Player 1 can choose to send nothing—the self-
interested “best” outcome, yielding the payoff: (Player 1= $10; Player 2 = $10). 
Or, alternatively, Player 1 chooses to send the entire ten dollars, which is tripled to 
thirty dollars. Player 2 can only respond with either of two actions: split the thirty 
dollars equally with Player 1, yielding the payoff (Player 1 = $15; Player 2 = $25 = 
$10 + $15), or take all the money resulting in the payoff (Player 1= $0; Player 2 = 
$40 =$10 + $ 30). In the first option, Player 1 receives a 50 percent larger amount 
than if nothing is sent. However, Player 2 receives an increase that is 150 percent 
larger than if Player 1 sent nothing.  Clearly, Player 2 is made strictly and 
asymmetrically better off. In the second option, however, Player 1 can end with 
nothing.  
By removing all context and starkly focusing on the hazards to any Player 1 who 
passes to Player 2, MS intentionally probe the boundary of validity of the original 
BDM results hypothesizing that this will discourage cooperative play.  
Remarkably and surprisingly the frequencies with which subjects offered and 
accepted the cooperative chose actions that were trusting and trustworthy were 
high enough that, on average, the earnings of both players increased relative to the 
self-interested equilibrium payoffs. Of twenty-four undergraduates, Twelve Player 
1s’ (50 percent) passed play to their counterpart Player 2 and nine of the twelve 
responded cooperatively (75 %), only three taking all the money (25 %).     
Also MS report the data for twenty-eight graduate PhD students who play the same 
game twice, knowing that they will retain the same pairing. 
First Play: Twenty-one (75%) pass to their counterpart Player 2, of which 16 
(76%) choose to cooperate, and only five ((24%) take all the money. Second 
9 
 
Play: Fourteen (50%) of Player 1s pass to their Player 2s of which nine 
(64%) cooperate, and only five (36%) defect. 
Far from failing this simplified, alleged self-interest promoting test, the MS 
subjects were even more other-regarding in rejecting non-cooperative action and 
tended to earn more money than in the BDM game. Thus, did MS introduce a 
simplified design that enabled subjects to better coordinate actions designed to 
achieve their cooperative intentions.  
How are we to explain these findings, so bizarre by accustomed economic 
standards?  
 RECIPROCITY AND SOCIAL PREFERNCE EXPLANATIONS 
Reciprocity Explanation 
As indicated in their title, reciprocity as an explanation of trusting and trustworthy 
behavior was very much part of how BDM thought about their discovery. Their 
title was not “Trust, Trustworthiness and Social History;” trustworthiness was 
identified with reciprocity in a non-market exchange.   
By sending money the first mover in the BDM game is offering to cooperate; by 
returning money the second mover is accepting the offer in an exchange; 
“reciprocity” is simply a word for describing those two actions.10 How can a 
description of what transpires be an explanation of why we observe the behavior? 
The argument is circular. (Smith and Wilson, 2019)11     
Social preference Explanation 
Social preference theory had its origins in the proposition that other-regarding 
action is a direct consequence of other-regarding preference or utility functions. 
(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002) What seemed to fail in BDM was the neoclassical 
assumption that people cared only about their own payoff. Thus—for generations 
of economists brought up on utility as the cause of all action—it was natural to 
 
10 Many of us fell into that pattern. Smith (1998) elevates reciprocity to the key to an understanding of the 
connection between Adam Smith’s (1759, 1776) two books. This is neither wrong, nor very deep, as an explanation 
of the results in BDM and the large subsequent literature demonstrating the robustness of their results. 
11 The same circular reasoning has been accepted to explain the strong tendency toward equal-split outcomes in 
the UG. The preference for “fair” outcomes is said to be the explanation and the cause. However, equal-split “fair” 
outcomes also constitute what is observed, which itself cannot serve as an explanation and a cause. It is correct to 
state that “[t]he (UG) data falsify the assumption that players maximize their own payoffs as clearly as 
experimental data can” which recognizes the contradiction between prediction and observation. But it is leading 
and questionable to add: “Since the equilibria are so simple to compute,… the ultimatum game is a crisp way to 
measure social preferences rather than a deep test of strategic thinking.” (Camerer, 2005, p 43) This inference 
follows only if all action is a direct consequence of preference, but it takes only one non-preference-based model 
of action to negate it.  Sentiments performs that function.      
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explain the new findings with a utility of the form U(own payoff, other payoff) in 
which actions reflected the actors concern about other as well as own payoff in the 
trust game.  But if social preference is to be the predictor of action, we need to 
know the form of the Utility function in advance. For example, suppose Player 1 
has social presences such that they want to transfer money to Player 2. Suppose 
Player 1 passes to player 2, and Player 1 defects; that mat be a better outcome than 
if Player 2 chooses the cooperative outcome. Social preference theory cannot 
assume that defection hurts Player 1. If Player 1 is given the opportunity to punish 
defection by Player 2, some do, but most do not. The methodology is that of 
retrofitting utility to actions discovered empirically, then looking for “epi-cycle” 
parameters that accommodate the observation.12     
Attempts to solve the puzzle—How do we explain and reconcile other-regarding 
action in BDM and its extensions with the self-interested acts of the same 
individuals in markets and other contexts—led to decades of experimental 
explorations. The puzzle also contributed to the discovery that Sentiments provided 
an independent means of interpreting and modelling action, wherein all individuals 
are strictly self-interested in preference, but follow rules that are other regrading. 
That development and its history in recounted in (Smith and Wilson, 2019, pp xiii-
xx.)       
HUMANOMICS OF TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS: WHY 
STRICTLY SELF-INTERESTED ACTORS CAN MAKE GOOD 
NEIGHBORS 
The subtitle of Sentiments states succinctly its message, “An Essay towards an 
Analysis of the Principles by which Men Naturally Judge the Conduct and 
Character, First of their neighbors and then of themselves.” (Smith, 1759; 1853, 
title page)  
In Sentiments we learn an alternative to reciprocity and social preference 
explanations of cooperation in our lives and in our experimental trust game data. 
Cooperation stems from human sociability and is governed by our rule-following 
conduct; the very word “conduct” suggests a pattern of proper manners emanating 
from our judgement of each other. Our actions are other-regarding as well as own-
regarding. Moreover, these actions are not direct consequences of our preferences, 
which are strictly self-interested, and not in any way conflictual with our actions 
either in markets or in our social world. To understand Sentiments, as economists 
who study behavior, we must distinguish between our self-interested preferences, 
 
12 Added to this procedure is the fact that “there is a professional tendency to view utility explanations as final—
once a result is deemed due to utility the conversation stops, implying that there is nothing left to explain or test.” 
Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (2008, p 415).  
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and our actions, which need not take the form of acting in accordance with this 
principle; that is, action need not have the form: Action if and only if Max U(own).   
“Though it may be true, therefore, that every individual, in his own breast, 
naturally prefers himself to all mankind, yet he dares not look mankind in 
the face, and avow that he acts according to this principle. He feels that in 
this preference they can never go along with him, and that how natural 
soever it may be to him, it must always appear excessive and extravagant to 
them. When be views himself in the light in which he is conscious that 
others will view him he sees that to them be is but one of the multitude, in 
no respect better than any other in it. If he would act so as that the impartial 
spectator13 may enter into the principles of his conduct, which is what of all 
things he has the greatest desire to do, he must upon this, as upon all other 
occasions, humble the arrogance of his self-love, and bring it down to 
something which other men can go along with.” (Smith, 1759; 1853, p 120) 
In fact, common knowledge that we are all self-interested is a necessary part of 
how we automatically know that a context-specific action is beneficial or hurtful to 
another and are thus able to implement the rules we follow in interacting with our 
neighbors. (Smith, 1759; 1853, p 112) 
What are the circumstances of life that determine this rule-following means of 
disciplining our actions?  
Smith observes that about the time we start to school and “mix with equals” we 
find that our play-fellows do not show the “indulgent partiality” of our parents in 
tolerating our expressions of anger; they use punishment to express their 
displeasure with our hurtful actions towards them, and find ways to reward our 
beneficent actions toward them. Thus, do we enter “the great school of self-
command” in “which the practice of the longest life is very seldom sufficient to 
bring to complete perfection.” (Smith, 1759; 1853, p 204, 206).14        
 
13 The “impartial spectator” in Sentiments is a metaphor for the means by which we learn to judge our own actions 
in the light or their impact on others—based on our sympathetic fellow-feeling toward others—and to choose in a 
manner that is properly other-regarding, and not only self-regarding. “We endeavour to examine our own conduct 
as we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it. If, upon placing ourselves in his situation, 
we thoroughly enter into all the passions and motives which influenced it, we approve of it, by sympathy with the 
approbation of this supposed equitable judge. If otherwise, we enter into his disapprobation, and condemn it.” 
(Smith, 1759; 1853, p 162) 
14 For Adam Smith self-command (or self-government) is the omnipresent gatekeeper of virtue and many 
situations may allow the “voice of human weakness” to undermine this self-command. (Smith, 1759; 1853, p 29) 
Consequently, higher stakes may tempt a decrease in trust/trustworthiness. But meta-analysis finds this not to be 
the case; generally the results documented by BDM and OFB were further validated, indicating bedrock support for 
trust and trustworthiness as expressions of human beneficence even under conditions of anonymity. (Johnson and 
Mislin, 2011, p 874)     
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The first proposition implied by the analysis in Sentiments—that drives the 
experimental observations in BDM, OFB and MS—is the following: “Actions of a 
beneficent tendency, which proceed from proper motives, seem alone to require a 
reward; because such alone are the approved objects of gratitude, or excite the 
sympathetic gratitude of the spectator.” (Smith, 1759; 1853, p 112)  
By proper motives, Smith is referring to intentionality: I do something good for 
you because I wanted to do something good for you. And he is here asserting the 
strong directive that such action alone induces in us a compulsion to reward the 
action, and this is because of the spontaneous fellow-feeling of gratitude that we 
experience. Furthermore, this is not just what the individual who is the target of the 
action experiences and responds to, but it also commands the agreement of every 
indifferent spectator. That is, every third-party observer easily agrees, or fellow 
feels, with the target of the action.15 In modern language we would call it a “social 
norm,” and here Smith is articulating a theory with specific a priori predictions of 
its action consequences.  
Regrettably, our abysmal ignorance of Sentiments prevented us, in the 1990s, from 
hypothesizing the implied behavior before we observed it.16 
Later, Smith uses this proposition to derive “reciprocity” (logically, as an 
implication) although he does not use that word in that context. Rather he asks who 
above all we should be kind to. Those who have been kind to us. Thus “Kindness 
is the parent of kindness.” (Smith, 1759; 1853, p 331) This is called the Principle 
of Beneficent Reciprocity by Smith and Wilson (2014, p 16).   Hence, Sentiments 
provides the underlying explanation for reciprocity, and is not circular as in the 
original trust game literature.     
Let us now think through the application of Smith’s first beneficence proposition 
to BDM (OFB) and MS.  The first mover is clearly under no obligation to send any 
 
15 Note the critical role for human fellow-feeling in Sentiments and the following corroborating results of trust 
game meta-analysis showing that it is important for senders to know that the receiver is a real person: “We also 
find that playing with a real person is associated with significantly more sent. While researchers sometimes employ 
simulated confederates to play the role of the receiver in the trust game, these studies rarely use a manipulation 
check to confirm that the experimenter’s attempts to deceive the participants have been successful. Our findings 
suggest that participants in such trust game experiments may in fact not all believe, as the experimenters wish 
them to, that they are playing with real counterparts. This could be due to flaws in the experimental procedures 
employed or even early participants informing later participants of the deception.” (Johnson and Misilin, p. 875).  
Recall that the BDM protocol made it credible that real people were matched with each other across two rooms.  
16 Harking back to those exciting discovery years, I should note that, even if we were given then our current 
understanding of Sentiments, there was reason aplenty for being skeptical that the proposition would be 
predictive—it might easily fail because of the deep cloak of secrecy implemented by BDM and OFB (but not MS).  
Hence, the BDM launch would have been no less path-breaking, by virtue of extending Sentiments significantly 
beyond its original presumed domain.      
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money, nor for the recipient to return money if any is sent. Moreover, the first 
mover is clearly at risk in getting nothing back. Knowing this, the recipient of any 
money sent can only infer that money was sent intentionally—an action that 
obviously and unambiguously benefits the recipient. Smith’s proposition predicts 
that the recipient feels gratitude and is motivated to reward the action by returning 
some money. How much? Well, more in positive relation to the benefit and 
gratitude felt--“the greater exertions of that virtue appear to deserve the highest 
reward. By being productive of the greatest good, they are the natural and 
approved objects of the liveliest gratitude.” (Smith, 1759; 1853, p 117) Smith’s 
theory, culminating in this proposition, predicts the tendency expressed in the data 
of BDM and OFB, but found more prominently in MS.    
Over and over, Sentiments stresses the importance of context, and across the BDM, 
OFC and MS treatments, context is being varied. (Also see Hoffman, McCabe and 
Smith, 2000) The data show clearly that context matters; the three studies all 
confirm Sentiments relative to utilitarian action in the self-interest, but actions in 
the MS game are most strongly consistent with Smith’s first proposition on 
beneficence. In MS, Player 1 sends a strong and unambiguous signal of benefit, or 
none, and this dichotomy, we can conjecture, accounts for the proposition’s greater 
consistency with MS.  
It should be noticed how natural it is to think about how Sentiments applies to the 
actions of the subjects. If the model fails, we know where to look for the cause. 
Gratitude may not be felt as with sociopathic-like tendencies. Or, gratitude might 
be felt, but it is insufficient to overcome the temptation to defect, suggesting 
further experiments that vary payoffs. In contrast, if the traditional dominant-
strategy, self-interested choice model fails, it says nothing about what to do next. 
We are left with no guidelines as to the next scientific step.    
I will close by stating a second proposition in Sentiments on beneficence and apply 
it to a new trust game in the MS framework. “Beneficence is always free, it cannot 
be extorted by force, the mere want of it exposes to no punishment; because the 
mere want of beneficence tends to do no real positive evil. It may disappoint of the 
good which might reasonably have been expected, and upon that account it may 
justly excite dislike and disapprobation: it cannot, however, provoke any 
resentment which mankind will go along with.”  (Smith, 1759; 1853, p 112)     
 Two recent experimental studies are directly motivated by this important 
proposition in which the benefit-reward calculus governed by the first proposition 
is said to be voided if there is any threat of coercion, thus predictively bounding 
the domain of conditions over which the first applies.  
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The first study observes that the literature on the UG is replete with evidence 
that Responders feel and express much anger which in turn explains the 
pattern of rejections across UG treatments. Since UG participation is always 
involuntarily assigned by the experimenter, this suggests a treatment effect 
emanating from the influence of coercion—the implicit threat of veto by the 
Responder. In new UG experiments, the Responders move first, choosing to 
either exit the game along with their paired Proposer, each receiving $1, or 
voluntarily entering the UG stage by passing to the Proposer who choose 
between an equal split of $24, or the equilibrium outcome (Player 1 = $2. 
Player 2 = $22). Ninety-four percent of Responders signal willingness-to-
play by passing play to the proposer. Remarkably, forty percent of the 
proposers offer the equilibrium option, and sixty-one percent accept—the 
highest known rate of equilibrium play, and of acceptance recorded in the 
extensive UG literature (Smith and Wilson, 2018; 2019, pp 135-141).17           
The second study directly tests Adam Smith’s second beneficent proposition 
in a new trust game, with the same extensive form structure as in MS, but 
different payoffs.  Player 1’s have two options: (1) pass to Player 2, who 
chooses the equilibrium ($12, $12), or ($10, $10); (2) pass to Player 2, who 
chooses either (Payoff 1, Payoff 2) = ($$18, $30), or ($6, $42).  If Player 1 
decides to not cooperate and choose the equilibrium option (1), and if Player 
2 wishes to punish Player I at a cost, we have the outcome ($10, $10). No 
Player 2 so chooses: Of thirty-eight pairs in this game, twenty-three Player 
1’s select option (1), but none choose to punish the action.18       
CONCLUSIONS 
That “Trust, Reciprocity and Social History” was a landmark paper in the history 
of experimental economics is indicated by several measures of academic impact: 
Citations, of course, but more precisely the results were unexpected, surprising and 
continue to inspire new trust game experiments; the results were replicable and 
robust; and they defined, along with the ultimatum game, the canonical structure 
and protocol for using trust games to examine human sociality.  
However, with the discovery that the results are consistent with key propositions in 
Sentiments—the lesser known first book written by the founder of economics, 
 
17 Of course the Proposer may or may not also feel anger; allowing the Proposer to voluntarily choose whether or 
not to enter the game may further impact their joint outcome.  
18 Yet in sharp contrast, Justice Propositions in Sentiments predict that if Player 1 offers cooperation, and Player 2 
defects, then—given a costly option to punish the defection—Player 1s will so choose, which indeed they do. 
(Smith and Wilson, 2019, pp 152-153) Hence, Adam Smith states general conditions that predict when people will 
use punishment strategies, and when they will not.    
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Adam Smith—I believe the paper became an important part of demonstrating the 
relevance of that monumental work for contemporary economics and the moral 
foundations of the human career. 
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